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Abstract
We introduce a logic programming language which supports hypothetical and counterfac-
tual reasoning. The language is based on a conditional logic which enables to formalize con-
ditional updates of the knowledge base. Due to the presence of integrity constraints,
alternative revisions of the knowledge base may result from an update. We develop an abduc-
tive semantics which captures dierent evolutions of the knowledge base. Furthermore, we
provide a goal-directed abductive proof procedure to compute the alternative solutions for
a goal. We finally analyze our conditional programming language in the context of belief
revision theory, and we establish a connection with Nebel’s prioritized base revision. Ó 2000
Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we deal with hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning in a logic
programming context. We aim at defining a conditional programming language in
which hypothetical updates of the knowledge base can be formalized. Our proposal
stems from N Prolog [18] and, as in N Prolog, we want to provide object level con-
structs to model hypothetical insertion of new facts in a program by allowing condi-
tional goals of the form D > G, where G is a goal and D is a set of atomic hypotheses,
and > denotes the conditional implication. Such conditional goals may also occur in
clause bodies.
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As a dierence with N Prolog and other logic programming languages based on
intuitionistic logic, we want to cope with a more complex case in which the database
may contain negative information in the form of constraints. In this case, the issue of
updating a program is tightly connected with that of maintaining its consistency, or
restoring it, whenever it is violated.
In a more abstract setting, this problem has been deeply studied in belief revision
theory [22]: given a theory T (or a belief set) and a formula A, we want to establish
what is the theory resulting by consistently adding A to T. The addition of the for-
mula A may require to discard some formulas of T which are inconsistent with A,
and, according to the usual postulates for revision, we want to modify the initial
theory T as little as possible.
Our aim is to incorporate a revision mechanism in our language and use this
mechanism to evaluate conditional goals. Since our logic programs are subject to re-
vision, we have to establish which part of the program may be aected by a revision,
that is, which part of the program may be overruled by inserting new data, and
which part may not.
In this paper we define a program as consisting of a protected (or permanent) part,
which cannot be aected by revision, and a revisable part. This distinction is com-
monly made both in belief revision, and in default reasoning (in particular, in default
theories one distinguishes default knowledge from certain knowledge). The protected
part contains clauses and integrity constraints of the form G!?, whose meaning is
that G must be false (? is a distinguished symbol denoting falsity). The revisable part
of the program consists of a set of atomic formulas and it is partitioned in dierent
priority classes.
When a conditional goal D > G is evaluated from a program P, the goal G is eval-
uated against the extended program P [ D. The insertion of D in P may produce an
inconsistency, so that a revision of the program is needed in order to restore consis-
tency. Such a revision cannot aect the protected part, but only the revisable part of
the program. More precisely, the atoms which are responsible for the inconsistency
and have the least priority are overruled.
When new atoms are hypothetically added to the program, they are incorporated
with the highest priority in its revisable part. For this reason, the revisable part of
the program consists of a sequence of sets of atoms which may change during the
computation.
In a previous paper [19], we have focused on the case where the atoms in the revi-
sable part of the program are totally ordered, and only single atomic updates are al-
lowed. In this case, a unique revision of the program can always be found when an
update is performed. On the contrary, when the revisable part of the program con-
tains several atoms with the same priority, there might be more than one revision of
the program. Generally speaking, the problem we have to face is that of reasoning
with multiple, possibly contradicting, sources of information ordered according to
their reliability. This issue has been tackled by several authors both in belief revision
(see Nebel’s prioritized revision [31]) and in database theory (see, for instance, Refs.
[3,11,32]). In particular, Cholvy in Ref. [11] deals with knowledge sources that are
consistent sets of literals, and makes a distinction between two possible attitudes to-
wards the preference ordering: the ‘‘suspicious’’ attitude and the ‘‘trusting’’ attitude.
The former consists in rejecting all information provided by a knowledge source, if a
part of it contradicts some more reliable knowledge source; the latter consists in
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rejecting only the information which contradicts the one contained in a more reliable
source. InRef. [12] logical systems are defined for reasoning according to each attitude.
In this paper we will adopt the ‘‘trusting attitude’’, although we can easily model
the ‘‘suspicious’’ attitude by a proper formulation of the knowledge base (we just
need to consider an update by a set of atoms as the update by the single formula
which is the conjunction of all of them). In our work the knowledge sources are just
sets of atoms, and inconsistencies among them may arise by violating the integrity
constraints in the permanent part of the program. Dierently from Ref. [12], our
programs usually contain background knowledge common to all sources (including
integrity constraints), and we do not assume each single source to be consistent. As
an example of use of the language for reasoning with multiple (inconsistent) sources
of information, consider the following, which comes from Ref. [3] and has also been
analyzed in Ref. [12].
Example 1.1. The example describes the knowledge of an inspector and of John and
Bill, witnesses of a murder. The inspector’s knowledge consists of the following setP
of clauses and constraints:
orange coat ! light coat
black coat ! dark coat
light coat ^ dark coat !?
orange coat ^ pink mercedes! suspect Jeff
black coat ^ pink mercedes! suspect Ed.
John’s and Bill’s knowledge consists of the following facts, respectively:
John  forange coat; no hat; pink mercedesg
Bill  fblack coat; no hatg.
Given the knowledge of the inspector, the information provided by John and Bill is
contradictory. Let us assume that Bill is more reliable than John, since Bill was closer
than John to the scene of the murder. The goal
forange coat; no hat; pink mercedesg > fblack coat; no hatg > suspect Ed
succeeds from P. On the other hand, the goal
forange coat; no hat; pink mercedesg > fblack coat; no hatg > suspect Jeff 
fails. This is because the information orange coat is not accepted, since it is in conflict
with the more reliable information black coat. Nevertheless, the inspector still be-
lieves pink_mercedes, coming from the same source (John), as we adopt a trusting
attitude.
Rather than removing an inconsistency as soon as it arises, the proof procedure
incorporated in our language maintains the consistency of logical consequences of
the database by making use of the priority among facts. In this respect we follow
the approach of Refs. [11,25,32].
For instance, in the previous example, the information orange coat is not accept-
ed, since it is overridden by the more reliable information black coat. However,
orange coat is not removed from the program. If, later on, a new witness Tom,
who is more reliable than both John and Bill, came out and said that the coat was
D. Gabbay et al. / J. Logic Programming 44 (2000) 37–74 39
light, then Bill’s information black_coat would be rejected and John’s information
orange coat would be accepted in turn. The inspector could hence prove suspect Jeff.
This would be the eect of evaluating the hypothetical goal
forange coat; no hat; pink mercedesg > fblack coat; no hatg
> light coat > suspect Jeff 
from the above program P.
In this paper we develop an abductive semantics which captures alternative solu-
tions possibly resulting when a conditional goal is evaluated against a program. Such
dierent solutions correspond to alternative, and equally possible, revisions of the
program. In our abductive semantics, we do not accept the totality requirement of
the stable model semantics, whose consequence is the fact that abductive solutions
do not always exist. In particular, we adopt an approximation of the acceptability
semantics [27] called the admissibility semantics [27], and we provide a goal directed
abductive proof procedure (in the style of Ref. [16]) to compute alternative solutions
for a goal. Such a procedure is sound with respect to the admissibility semantics and
it is defined in the style of those proposed in Ref. [38] to compute the acceptability
semantics.
2. The language
In this section we informally introduce the main features of the language through
some examples. We will deal only with the propositional case.
Let true and ? be distinguished propositions (whose meaning is true and incon-
sistent, respectively) and let A denote atomic propositions dierent from ?. We re-
gard ? as a proposition without any special properties, since we will use ? to express
integrity constraints in the program, and we do not want to derive everything from
the violation of integrity constraints. The syntax of the language is the following:
G :: true j A j G1 ^ G2 j fA1; . . . ;Ang > G
D :: G! A
I :: G!? :
In this definition G stands for a goal, D for a clause and I for an integrity con-
straint. Notice that a goal G may contain nested hypothetical implications, e.g.,
fa; bg > fcg > a ^ c, and that hypothetical implications may occur in the body
of clauses and constraints, e.g., in the formulas fa; bg > fcg > a ^ fbg > c
! d and fag > c ^ f !? :
We assume that > associates to the right. For simplicity, in the following we will
write a instead of the clause true! a, and a > b instead of the goal fag > b.
A program P  P j L consists of a set P of clauses and integrity constraints, and a
list L  S1 . . . Sn, where each Si is a set of atoms (facts). We call P the permanent da-
tabase, or the permanent part of a program and L the revisable part of the program.
While the clauses and constraints in P cannot be removed, i.e., they are protected,
the facts in L are revisable: each fact A 2 Si in L can be used in a proof unless it is
inconsistent with P together with some facts B 2 Sj (with jP i) with higher or equal
priority. Hence, we assume a total ordering among sets of atoms in the list L, and
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each Si is less preferred than Si1. We assume that atoms in Sn have the highest
priority, as the permanent part P, and they cannot be removed.
We will now give an informal introduction to a goal directed proof procedure for
the language. We will write P j S1 . . . Sn ‘ G to represent the derivation of goal G
from the program P  P j S1 . . . Sn.
During the computation the protected part of the program remains fixed, while
the list of revisable atoms changes as an eect of the updates. When an atom H from
the list L is needed in a proof, it must be verified that it is not inconsistent with the
atoms with equal or higher priority (i.e., it must be verified that, assuming H, an in-
consistency cannot be derived from the permanent database and the atoms of equal
or higher priority). This can be achieved by temporarily extending the program with
the assumption H, and by checking that the extended program does not derive ?.
Thus, in general, we represent the derivation of a goal from a context with three
components:
P j S1 . . . Sn j fHg
where H represents a temporary hypothesis, which is checked for consistency, and it
is virtually part of Sn. However, we keep it separate from Sn since when we enter a
new context, represented by a further update Sn1, we do not want to assume it any-
more. In the following examples we write the third component fHg only when it is
not empty.
Let us consider the following example, adapted from Ref. [1].
Example 2.1. The permanent part P contains the following rules:
tv on! watch tv
power failure! not tv on
tv on ^ not tv on!?
power failure ^ not power failure!?.
Let us consider the derivation of a hypothetical goal from P.
P j  ‘ tv on > watch tv:
The set of atoms in the antecedent of the conditional goal is added to the revisable
part of the program with highest priority:
P j ftv ong ‘ watch tv
and it succeeds using the first rule in P and the hypothesis tv on, which has the
highest priority.
Let us consider now the following derivation:
P j  ‘ tv on > power failure > watch tv
P j ftv ongfpower failureg ‘ watch tv
P j ftv ongfpower failureg ‘ tv on:
Since the fact tv on is in the revisable part with the lowest priority, the above deriva-
tion can succeed only if tv on is consistent with all the assumptions of higher priority,
that is to say, if by assuming tv on as a temporary hypothesis we cannot derive ?.
Thus, the following derivation should fail:
P j ftv ongfpower failureg j ftv ong ‘? :
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On the contrary, since both power failure and tv on have the highest priority in the
context of this derivation, the derivation succeeds using the second and third rule of
P, thus the initial goal tv on > power failure > watch tv fails.
Notice that the goal fails because we can apply ‘‘persistency’’ rules only to atoms
which are explicitly contained in the sets Si of a given context, and not to atoms de-
rived from them through program rules, like watch tv. This policy has the same eect
as the one adopted in Ref. [1]. Continuing with the example, the following derivation
succeeds:
P j  ‘ tv on > power failure > not power failure > watch tv:
To see this, the above query steps to
P j ftv ongfpower failuregfnot power failureg ‘ tv on
and a new consistency derivation starts:
P j ftv ongfpower failuregfnot power failureg j ftv ong ‘? :
We get:
P j ftv ongfpower failuregfnot power failureg j ftv ong ‘ power failure;
which, again, activates a new consistency derivation
P j fpower failuregfnot power failureg j fpower failureg ‘?;
which succeeds.
Therefore power failure does not hold in the context P j ftv ongfpower failureg
fnot power failureg, and thus tv on holds in the same context.
Note that, to prove the ‘‘persistency’’ of power failure in the above context, we
have removed the first set ftv ong from it. The reason is that ftv ong has a lower pri-
ority than power failure, and thus it cannot block the ‘‘persistency’’ of power failure.
Dierently from other approaches to program updates, in this language we can
update programs by adding atoms, but not arbitrary rules. Actually we could
achieve the same eect of the conditional goal with an embedded rule
a! b > c, by giving a name to the rule, say r, adding the rule a ^ r! b to the
permanent part P, and then rewriting the goal as r > c. However, this only works
if one knows in advance all the rules which may be used to update the database.
2.1. Conditional goals in rule bodies
The following examples show the usefulness of conditional goals in rules in a va-
riety of situations, from counterfactual and relevant reasoning, to state-change de-
scription. In these examples we make use of variables within rules. In some of the
examples, however, this use can be considered as a shorthand notation for a propo-
sitional program, and this works as long as the updates of the program are always
ground facts. Although in this paper we do not deal with the first order case in detail,
we refer to Section 6 for a broader discussion on the subject.
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Example 2.2. This example comes from Ref. [18], and contains a (potentially) count-
erfactual rule for the definition of the predicate british citizen. Let P be the set of
clauses and constraints:
born in UKX  ^ fatherX ; Y  ^ aliveY ; T  > british citizenY ; T 
! british citizenX ; T 
british citizenZ; T1 ^ less thanT1; T2 ^ aliveZ; T2 ! british citizenZ; T2
deadX ; T  ^ aliveX ; T  !? :
The goal british citizenbob; 1984 succeeds from the program:
P  P j fborn in UKbob; fatherbob; tom; british citizentom; 1950;
deadtom; 1984; less than1950; 1984g:
To see this, the subgoals born in UKbob and fatherbob; tom succeed from P.
Moreover, the subgoal alivetom; 1984 > british citizentom; 1984 also succeeds
from P since british citizentom; 1984 succeeds from the program revised by adding
alivetom; 1984. On the other hand, notice that, the query
alivetom; 1984 > deadtom; 1984
fails from P, since dead(tom,1984) is overridden by the addition of alive(tom, 1984).
Example 2.3. This example, taken from Ref. [4], shows how some form of ‘‘relevant’’
reasoning can be captured in our hypothetical language. Imagine a geographic re-
gion divided, for whatever reasons, in zones. A predicate state(Z, S) asserts that S
holds in zone Z. For instance, the atom state(zone1, polluted) will mean that zone1
is polluted. In P we have the following rules which allow to infer new states from
given ones:
(1) stateZ1; downwind of Z2 ^ stateZ2; factory ! stateZ1; polluted
(2) stateZ; toxic dump ^ stateZ; populated ! stateZ; danger to pop.
Given a set of facts, for instance
statezone1; downwind of zone2
statezone4; toxic dump
statezone4; populated
we may be interested in questions like ‘‘What would happen if a factory were to be
built in zone2?’’. We can express the query through the conditional implication
statezone2; factory > stateX ; Y . In evaluating this query, we would rather restrict
the answer to the states that really depend on the hypothesis, while discarding those
states that hold anyway, irrespectively of the new, specific hypothesis. Continuing on
this line, suppose we want to define a new predicate bad stateZ; S to denote un-
wanted states. The intention is to provide an inductive definition of this predicate
by representing a causality relation: a state Z1 is considered ‘‘bad’’ either by a base
condition (e.g., bad stateZ1; polluted) or because it causes another state Z2, that
we know to be ‘‘bad’’ on some respect S2 (i.e., for some S2; badZ2; S2 holds). Here
‘‘causes’’ means not only that from the hypothesis stateZ1; S1 we can derive
stateZ2; S2, but also that stateZ2; S2 would not hold, if we did not assume
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stateZ1; S1. In other words, the hypothesis stateZ1; S1 must be relevant to get the
conclusion stateZ2; S2. Bollen discusses the impossibility to represent such hypo-
thetical conditions by means of intuitionistic implication, and proposes the use of
a particular relevant logic. We can easily define the predicate bad state in the correct
way in our language, by means of the following rules (that we include in P):
(3) bad stateZ; polluted
(4) bad stateZ; danger to pop (and so on, for the basic cases)
(5) bad stateZ2; S2 ^ stateZ1; S1 > stateZ2; S2 ^ not stateZ2; S2
! bad stateZ1; S1
(6) stateZ; S ^ not stateZ; S !?.
The predicate not stateZ; S asserts that S does not hold in zone Z. Rule (5) says
that stateZ1; S1 is a bad state if there is some pair Z2; S2 which is a bad state, and the
assumption stateZ1; S1 is ‘‘relevant’’ to the conclusion stateZ2; S2. That is, we can
conclude stateZ2; S2 with the hypothesis stateZ1; S1, but we could not derive it un-
less we make this assumption. Relevance is ensured by the antecedent
not stateZ2; S2 in rule (5). If we omitted it, by rule (5) every state would be a bad
state, if there exists one of them.
Let us consider the following program, where we assume a finite number of
ground zones zonei, and properties pj, so that the number of revisable atoms
not statezonei; pj is finite.
P  P j fnot statezonei; pj; 8 zonei; pjg;
fstatezone1; downwind of zone2; statezone4; toxic dump;
statezone4; populatedg:
The goal bad state(zone2, factory) succeeds: since zone1 is downwind of zone2, under
the hypothesis that there is a factory in zone2, we can conclude statezone1; polluted,
which could not be concluded without this hypothesis.
On the other hand, the goal bad state(zone5, mine) does not succeed from P: add-
ing a mine in zone5 does not cause any new bad state.
Example 2.4. The following program, taken from Ref. [6], finds a Hamiltonian path
in a graph.
selectX  ^ markX  > pathX  ! hamiltonian
edgeX ; Y  ^ selectY  ^ markY  > pathY  ! pathX 
all marked ! pathX 
nodeX  ^ not markedX  ! selectX 
markedX  ^ not markedX  !?
all marked ^ not markedX  !?.
Besides the above rules and constraints, P contains also the representation of a
directed graph by means of the predicates node and edge. If the graph has n nodes,
1; . . . ; n, the existence of a Hamiltonian path can be checked by:
P j  ‘ all marked > fnot marked1; . . . ; not markedng > hamiltonian
that is
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P j fall markedgfnot marked1; . . . ; not markedng ‘ hamiltonian:
Since all nodes are not marked, the rule for hamiltonian will select any node, say 1,
mark it, and create the new derivation:
P j fall markedgfnot marked1; . . . ; not markedngfmarked1g ‘ path1:
At a generic step of the derivation we will have a context of this kind:
P j fall markedgfnot marked1; . . . ; not markedng
fmarked1g . . . fmarkedkg:
In this context markedX  has always a higher priority than not markedX . Thus
select can only select unmarked nodes. Furthermore the derivation terminates suc-
cessfully only when all marked holds. Since this atom has the lowest priority, this
can happen only when all facts not markedX  are blocked, i.e., when all nodes have
been marked.
Example 2.5. The update mechanism of our language provides a way to represent
state changes. This example describes the operations of withdrawal and deposit on
an account. The set P contains the clauses and constraints:
amountZ ^ amountZ  Y  > holdsamountX ; L
! holdsamountX ; depositY jL
amountZ ^ amountZ ÿ Y  > holdsamountX ; L
! holdsamountX ; withdrawY jL
amountZ ! holdsamountZ;  
amountX  ^ amountY  ^ X 6 Y !?.
The first rule says that the amount of the account will be X after a sequence of
operations L starting with the deposit of Y if, assuming that the current amount
Z is increased by Y, we can conclude that it will be X after the remaining operations.
The second rule is similar. The third rule says that, if the current amount is Z, it will
be so after an empty sequence of operations. The constraint says that it is not pos-
sible for the amount to have two distinct values.
Assume that initially the account contains the amount of $5000, and that we want
to determine the amount after the sequence of operations withdraw3000 and
deposit1000.
We let the program P be
P  P j famount5000g:
As expected, the goal holdsamountX ; withdraw3000; deposit1000, succeeds
with X  2000 from the program.
Notice that this example could not be modelled by making use of a language with
hypothetical implications based on an intuitionistic logic, like N Prolog, in which
facts can be added, but never deleted. We want the addition of a new value for
amount to cancel the old value. To this purpose, it is proposed in Ref. [6] to augment
intuitionistic logic programming by a hypothetical deletion operator. Along a dier-
ent line, in Ref. [26] it is shown how to handle similar examples in a logic program-
ming language based on intuitionistic linear logic; in that language deletion of facts is
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realized by consuming formulas as resources. In our language, deletion is realized
through the addition of inconsistent facts.
2.2. Multiple solutions and normal defaults
In the previous examples the revisable facts which may violate the integrity con-
straints have always dierent priorities, so that there is only one way of eliminating
inconsistencies, namely we remove the inconsistent facts with the lowest priority.
However, in general, it is possible to have mutually inconsistent facts with the same
priority. This may give rise to multiple and alternative solutions, as the following
example illustrates.
Example 2.6. Let us consider a simple circuit consisting of a battery connected with
a bulb, with the constraint that the light cannot be on and off at the same time.
Let P be the following set of clauses and constraints
n battery ! voltage
voltage ^ n bulb! light on
light on ^ light off !? :
The propositions n battery and n bulb state that the respective components work
normally, and will be assumed with the lowest priority, so that they can be removed
in case of inconsistency.
Let us assume now that we make the observation that the light is o. Since the
certainty of light off is higher than that of the normal behaviour of the components,
we give it higher priority. This can be represented by the following context:
P j fn battery; n bulbgflight off g:
It is easy to see that n battery and n bulb are mutually inconsistent if light-off holds,
and thus they cannot both persist through light off. Then we have two solutions: in
the first one n battery holds and n bulb does not; in the second, the opposite holds.
For instance, the following derivation will succeed in the first solution
P j fn battery; n bulbgflight off g ‘ n battery:
However the derivation procedure we have outlined in the previous examples would
not terminate in this case. Indeed, the success of n battery depends on n bulb non be-
ing proved, and vice versa. The two hypotheses n battery and n bulb appear in the
same set in the updatable part of the program, therefore they have the same priority,
and there is no reason for deleting one instead of the other.
The existence of alternative, and equally plausible, solutions for this problem can
be captured by an abductive semantics, and, operationally, by an abductive proce-
dure which keeps track of the assumptions it makes during the derivation. The
abductive semantics and procedure will be explained in detail in the next sections.
It should be clear that the revision policy adopted in the language is nonmonoton-
ic. Given a program P  P j S1 . . . Sn, a fact A 2 Si is assumed to hold in P if it is con-
sistent to do so. Thus, the language is well suited to perform several types of
defeasible reasoning, and in particular, it provides a straightforward way to repre-
sent normal defaults.
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For instance, it is easy to see that the two solutions of the previous example
correspond to the solutions which would be obtained in a default theory with the
following defaults:
: n battery
n battery
and
: n bulb
n bulb
together with the set of rules in P interpreted as formulas in classical logic.
Furthermore, in our language we can assign priorities to the hypotheses, and rep-
resent default reasoning with exceptions. The problem of dealing with exceptions
arises in many areas. A significant example, regarding normative conflicts in legal
reasoning, is given by Sartor in Ref. [37].
Example 2.7. In the Italian legal system there is a general principle stating contrac-
tual liberty: the parties are free to determine the contents of their contracts. This can
be represented by the following rule, named contractForce:
contractForceC ^ contractC ^ establishesC;R ! holdsR:
However, a law introduced in the Seventies stated that rent prices for dwellings could
not be freely established by parties, but they were determined by fixed legal criteria.
A contract establishing a higher rent price was to be considered as not holding:
fixedPricesH ^ houseH ^ legalpriceP2;H ^ P2 < P1
! not holdsrentpriceP1;H;
where fixedPrices is the name of this rule. Furthermore:
holdsX  ^ not holdsX  !? :
In the Eighties, new norms were introduced which excluded the constraints on rent
prices for houses located in small towns, thus acting as exceptions to the previous
law:
fixedPricesExcH ^ fixedPricesH ^ houseH ^ situatedH ;M
^ inhabitantsM ;N ^ N < 20; 000!?
Let us assume now that the permanent database P contains also the following facts
contractc1:
establishesc1; rentprice300; 000; house1:
househouse1:
legalprice200; 000; house1:
situatedhouse1; town1:
inhabitantstown1; 10; 000:
contractc2:
establishesc2; rentprice300; 000; house2:
househouse2:
legalprice200; 000; house2:
situatedhouse2; town2:
inhabitantstown2; 50; 000:
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The goal
holdsrentprice300; 000; house1
succeeds from the following program
P  P j fcontractForcec1; contractForcec2g
ffixedPriceshouse1; fixedPriceshouse2g
ffixedPricesExchouse1; fixedPricesExchouse2g:
In the derivation of the above goal, the assumption fixedPrices(house1) is overruled
because it is inconsistent with fixedPricesExc(house1) which has higher priority, and,
in turn, contractForce(c1) can be consistently assumed. On the other hand the goal
holdsrentprice300; 000; house2
fails, as the exception is not valid for house2, and thus fixedPrices(house2) blocks
contractForce(c2).
2.3. Negation as failure
In our language we can easily represent normal logic programs with negation as
failure. We model negation as failure by replacing each negative literal not q, with
the goal q > true > q, where q is a new symbol representing the negation of q. The
idea is to add the atom q to the program, and then check if it is consistent with it.
The embedded implication with antecedent true is needed since atoms added to
the program through the last update cannot be removed (i.e., q > q always succeeds).
A normal program P containing clauses with negation can be represented in our
language by a permanent database P containing: (a) the clauses obtained from those
of P by replacing each negative goal not q with the goal q > true > q, and (b) for
each new symbol q, the constraint q ^ q!? :
Let us see how the goal q > true > q, is proved from P:
P j  ‘ q > true > q; 
P j fqg ‘ true > q;
P j fqgftrueg ‘ q;
which succeeds if the derivation
P j fqgftrueg j fqg ‘?
finitely fails.
Since P contains only constraints of the form p ^ p !?; and no atom p is defined
in P, the only rule applicable to derive ? is q ^ q!? : Hence, () succeeds if q ^ q
fails from P j fqg; ftrueg j fqg, that is, if q fails from that program.
If, in the proof of q, a new negative goal not s has to be proved, then the following
derivations are obtained:
P j fqgftrueg ‘ s > true > s
P j fqgftruegfsg ‘ true > s
P j fqgftruegfsgftrueg ‘ s
which succeeds if the derivation
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P j fsgftrueg j fsg ‘?
finitely fails.
Note that the hypothesis q is removed from the context in the last step of the der-
ivation because it has lower priority than s. Since a symbol p may only occur within a
conditional goal of the form p > true > p, no more than one hypothesis p will be
used from a context L (namely, the one with the highest priority).
We discuss the semantics of this representation of normal logic programs at the
end of Section 3, after we have introduced a logical characterization of our language.
3. Logical characterization of the language
We present a logical characterization of our nonmonotonic language in two steps.
First, we introduce a conditional logic which describes the monotonic part of the lan-
guage. Then, we provide an abductive semantics to account for the nonmonotonic be-
haviour of the language. For a simpler language with single atomic updates, an
alternative account of the nonmonotonic part of the language has been given in
Ref. [21] by defining a completion construction. In contrast, here we adopt an abduc-
tive approach, which, as we have seen, is needed to capture alternative revisions of
the program.
3.1. The conditional logic CLU
We define a conditional logic CLU (conditional logic for updates). The language
L> of CLU contains in addition to the usual boolean connectives: a conditional op-
erator > and a modal operator , used to denote permanent formulas, that is, those
formulas which always hold. We also assume that the language contains a special
atomic proposition ?, without any special meaning. In this conditional language,
we represent a hypothetical implication fA1; . . . ;Ang > G, by the conditional formula
A1 ^    ^ An > G. Since all the formulas in the persistent part of the program have to
be permanent, we regard the implication! in clauses and constraints as strict impli-
cation: a clause (or a constraint) G! A is regarded as a shorthand for G  A,
where  is material implication, with the meaning that G  A is permanently true.
Conditional logic CLU contains the following axioms and inference rules:
(CLASS) All classical axioms and inference rules;
(ID) a > a;
(RCK) if ‘ a  b, then ‘ c > a  c > b;
(AND) a > b ^ a > c  a > b ^ c
(S5) a  b  a  b
}a  }a1
a  a
(Nec) if ‘ a, then ‘ a;
(IA) a  b > a
1 As usual, } is defined as the dual of , that is, }a    a.
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We can make a few remarks about the interpretation of the axioms of CLU. The
axiom (ID) a > a means that after an update which adds a to the database, a is true.
The modality  is ruled by the axioms of S5, since its meaning is ‘‘true in all con-
texts’’. Axiom (IA) is an interaction axiom that relates the conditional operator
and the modal operator. It means that if a always holds then it has to hold after
any update of the database. This axiom is known in standard axiomatizations of
conditional logics as (Mod) [33]. This conditional logic has some relation with the
multimodal logic developed in Ref. [20], but we believe that conditional logic pro-
vides a more natural formalization.
We can define a model-theoretic semantics for this logic in the line of standard
possible-world semantics of conditional logics. The intuitive idea of this semantic
is that, in order to evaluate a conditional a > b at a world w, we consider whether
b hold in the ‘‘closest’’ worlds to w which satisfy a. From a formal point of view,
possible-world models are equipped with a world-selection function f. Given a for-
mula a and world w, f picks up the set f a;w of the closest worlds to w that satisfy
a. Thus, in order to evaluate a conditional a > b in a world w, we have to check
whether b holds in all worlds in f a;w.
Definition 3.1. A modelM is a triple M  W ; f ; V , whereW is a non-empty set, f is
a function of typeL W ! PowW  and V is a mapping of type W ! PowAtoms.
The truth conditions are as follows:
M ;w  p if p 2 V w;
M ;w  a ^ b if M ;w  a and M ;w  b;
M ;w  a if M ;w2a;
M ;w  a if 8w0 2 W M ;w0  a;
M ;w  a > b if 8w0 2 f a;w M ;w0  b.
We assume that
ID if w0 2 f a;w then M ;w0  a:
Given a set of formulas C, we write M ;w  C ifM ;w  a for all a 2 C. Given a set of
formulas C and a formula a, we define
C CLU a i for every M  W ; f ; V , for every w 2 W , we have
M ;w  C implies M ;w  a.
In particular, when C  ;, we have CLU a i for every M  W ; f ; V , for every
w 2 W , M ;w  a; in this case we say that a is valid.
Theorem 3.1 (Soundness and Completeness). For all set of formulas C and formulas
a, C ‘ a iff C CLU a.
We omit the proof of the above theorem which can be done by standard tech-
niques (see, for instance, Ref. [33]).
3.2. The abductive characterization
In this section we propose an abductive characterization of our hypothetical lan-
guage by introducing ‘‘persistency’’ assumptions as abducibles. Such assumptions
50 D. Gabbay et al. / J. Logic Programming 44 (2000) 37–74
are used to force the persistency of a fact in the revisable part of the program, when it
is not in conflict with other facts having higher priority.
The choice of an abductive semantics is motivated by the fact that we are consid-
ering programs in which facts belonging to the revisable part are not totally ordered.
Equally reliable facts may be inconsistent with each other, so that, when the program
is updated, more than one revision may be obtained in general. By an abductive se-
mantics, we can capture these alternative models through dierent abductive solu-
tions.
We develop our abductive semantics in the context of the argumentation frame-
work [5,15]. The argumentation framework is a general methodology that can cap-
ture many nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms, including logic programming,
abductive logic programming, logic programs extended with explicit negation, de-
fault logic, and other nonmonotonic logics. In particular, many of the semantics pro-
posed for logic programming with negation as failure, e.g., stable models, partial
stable models, preferred extensions, well-founded models, can be captured within
the acceptability semantics, which is a particular argumentation semantics [27,38].
The argumentation framework has the nice property of being modular with respect
to the chosen logic and set of hypotheses. Therefore we can adopt this nonmonoton-
ic abductive construction on the base of our conditional logic CLU. More precisely,
we choose a specific kind of acceptability semantics, called the admissibility seman-
tics [14].
As mentioned in Section 2 our conditional language has a nonmonotonic behav-
iour. An atom in the revisable part of the program holds if it is not in conflict with
other atoms of higher priority, which may be added along a derivation. To model the
non-monotonic behaviour, we introduce abductive assumptions, or (abducibles) of the
form
S1 >    > Sn > A, with A 2 S1,2
whose meaning is that an atom A in S1 holds after the sequence of updates S1; . . . ; Sn.
An abducible S1 >    > Sn > A, with A 2 S1 may be assumed to hold, unless it is
blocked. This happens when the ‘‘negation’’ of A, :A,3 holds after the sequence
S1 . . . Sn of updates.
The  modality in an abducible formula S1 >    > Sn > A is needed to ex-
press that: if A 2 S1 holds after the addition of S1 . . . Sn to the program, then it also
holds after the addition of S01 . . . S
0
mS1 . . . Sn (in other words, we want the conditional
formula S01 >    > S0m > S1 >    > Sn > A to hold). This is motivated by the ob-
servation that, since the atoms in S01 . . . S
0
m have a lower priority than those in S1, they
do not have any influence on the persistency of atoms in S1.
LetH be the set of all possible abducibles. We can define the notion of abductive
solution for a permanent database P in the logic CLU as follows.
Definition 3.2. Given two disjoint sets of abducibles DT and DF (H), we say that
DT ;DF  is an abductive solution for a permanent database P if
2 By an abuse of notation, we write Si to intend the conjunction of the atom it contains i.e.,
V
Si.
3 :A is to be interpreted as A ? and must not be confused with  A which denotes the boolean
negation.
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(a) for all S1 >    > Sn > A 2 DF , P [ DT CLU S1 >    > Sn > :A;
(b) for all S1 >    > Sn > A 2 DT , P [ Hÿ DF 2CLU S1 >    > Sn > :A.
Condition (a) says that all the abducibles in DF are blocked by those in DT .
Condition (b) says that no abducible in DT can be contradicted without assuming
the abducibles in DF . Notice that, since DT and DF are disjoint, DT Hÿ DF . There-
fore, from (b) we can conclude that whenever S1 >    > Sn > A 2 DT , then
P [ DT 2CLU S1 >    > Sn > :A, that is, DT is not self-contradictory.
Note that, given a program P, an abductive solution for P always exists. Trivial-
ly, DT ;DF  with DT  ; and DF  ; is an abductive solution for any P.
Definition 3.3. Given a goal G, DT ;DF  is an abductive solution for G in a permanent
database P if it is an abductive solution for P such that P [ DT CLU G.
Let us consider again Example 2.6, describing the circuit with a battery connected
with a bulb. P has two abductive solutions DT ;DF  and D0T ;D0F , where
DT  fn battery ^ n bulb > light off > n batteryg;
DF  fn battery ^ n bulb > light off > n bulbg
and
D0T  fn battery ^ n bulb > light off > n bulbg;
D0F  fn battery ^ n bulb > light off > n batteryg:
It is easily seen that the former is a solution for the goal G1 
fn battery; n bulbg > flight off g > n battery, whereas the latter is a solution for
the goal G2  fn battery; n bulbg > flight off g > n bulb. However, there is no ab-
ductive solution DT ;DF  containing both the abducibles n battery ^ n bulb
> light off > n battery and n battery ^ n bulb > light off > n bulb in DT .
This set of hypotheses does not satisfy condition (b), since each one of its assump-
tions blocks the other one. For this reason, as expected, there is no abductive solu-
tion for the goal fn battery; n bulbg > flight off g > light on.
Notice that the conditions (a) and (b) above do not ensure that DT is consistent
with P, i.e., that DT [P2CLU ?. This may happen, for instance, if P itself is incon-
sistent.
Hence, it is natural to define:
Definition 3.4. DT ;DF  is a consistent abductive solution for a permanent database P
if DT ;DF  is an abductive solution for P and DT [P2CLU ?.
Given a goal G, DT ;DF  is a consistent abductive solution for G in P if it is a con-
sistent abductive solution for P such that P [ DT CLU G.
However, it can be shown that an abductive solution for a database P is incon-
sistent just in the case P itself is.
Proposition 3.1. Given a permanent database P, P is consistent (that is P2CLU ?) if
and only if every abductive solution for P is consistent.
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Proof. The ‘‘if’’ direction is trivial. For the ‘‘only if’’ direction, let DT ;DF  be an
abductive solution for P. Suppose P [ DT CLU?. Since every formula in P [ DT
has a  in front, we have that P [ DT CLU  ?, whence for every abducible
S1 >    > Sn > A, with A 2 S1, we have P [ DT CLU S1 >    > Sn > :A. Since
DT Hÿ DF , we get
P [ Hÿ DF  CLU S1 >    > Sn > :A:
But DT ;DF  is an abductive solution, thus by condition (b), it must be DT  ;. Thus,
we get P CLU?, that is P is inconsistent. 
The notion of abductive solution defined above corresponds to that of admissible
solution [14], in the case of normal logic programs, i.e., conventional logic programs
with negation by failure. In particular, the admissible semantics for logic programs
can be expressed within our framework by letting the set H of abductive assump-
tions be the set of negative atoms not A, as it is usual in the abductive characteriza-
tions of negation by failure. Roughly speaking, not A can be assumed if A cannot be
proved from the program.
More precisely, given two disjoint sets of negative assumptions DT and DF we say
that DT ;DF  is an abductive solution for a normal logic program P if
(a0) for all not A 2 DF ,P [ DT  A;
(b0) for all not A 2 DT , P [ Hÿ DF 2A.
The above definition of abductive solution corresponds to the one of admissible
solution given in Ref. [27] within the argumentation framework (in particular, DT
is an admissible solution). In that framework, a set of abducibles D is defined to
be admissible if, for any set of abducibles C which attacks D, there is a subset of
D (a defence) which in turn attacks C. In our formulation, the additional set of ab-
ducibles DF within an admissible solution represents the set of culprits, i.e., those as-
sumptions whose failure guarantees a defence to the solution. More precisely, DF
must contain at least one assumption from each attack A to DT , and this assumption,
in turn, must be counterattacked by DT . In the following section we define an abduc-
tive proof procedure for computing admissible solutions.
In Section 2 we have shown that normal programs can be represented in our con-
ditional language. It is not dicult to see that the semantics enforced by this repre-
sentation of normal logic programs is actually the admissibility semantics. We give
an informal proof of this claim. Given a normal logic program P and its conditional
representation PP (as defined in Section 2) we can easily map abductive solutions for
P (as defined above, where assumptions are of the form not q) to abductive solutions
for PP (containing the corresponding assumptions of the form q > true > q), and
the other way round. The correspondence is easy, since clauses in PP only contain
conditional goals of the form q > true > q. Since our notion of abductive solution
(as stated in Definition 3.3) corresponds to that of admissible solution for normal
programs, an abductive solution for PP is actually an admissible solution for P.
The admissibility semantics is rather weak in comparison – for instance – with the
stable model semantics. In particular, preferred extensions [14] and three-valued sta-
ble models [36] correspond to maximal admissible solutions. In this paper we have
adopted the admissibility semantics because of its simplicity; however, given the
modularity of the abductive construction, we could have chosen other (stronger)
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acceptability semantics. For instance, if we add the totality requirement,
DT [ DF H, to Definition 3.3, we obtain the notion of abductive solution present-
ed in Ref. [20]. This notion is essentially a generalization of the stable model seman-
tics [23].
4. Operational semantics
4.1. The monotonic procedure
We first introduce a monotonic deduction procedure which captures the basic de-
duction mechanism. The non-monotonic deduction procedure can be seen as an ab-
ductive extension of this monotonic procedure. The monotonic procedure makes use
of persistency assumptions, but it does not create them. It will be the task of the ab-
ductive procedure to compute these sets of persistency assumptions. These sets are
the DT -part of abductive solutions; as far as the monotonic procedure is concerned,
the assumptions in DT are input data. Since we do not care about the DF -part (that is
the negative assumptions), we just write D, rather than DT , as input data of the
monotonic procedure.
Definition 4.1. Given a permanent database P, a sequence of sets S1 . . . Sn, a hypoth-
esis H, a set D of abducibles of the form Si >    > Sn > A, and a goal G, we
define the monotonic deduction relation
P;D j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘M G:
as follows:
(S-T) P;D j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘M true
(S-^) P;D j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘M G1 ^ G2 if
P;D j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘M G1 and
P;D j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘M G2
(S->) P;D j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘M S > G if
P;D j S1 . . . SnS j ; ‘M G
(S-A) P;D j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘M A if
(i) A 2 Sn or A  H , or
(ii) there exists G! A 2 P such that P;D j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘M G, or
(iii) A 2 Si (i  1 . . . nÿ 1) and Si >    > Sn > A 2 D.
We prove that the above deduction procedure is sound and complete with respect
to the conditional logic CLU.
Theorem 4.1. (Soundness). If P;D j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘M G then P [ D CLU S1 >   
Sn > H  G.
Proof. By induction on the height h of a derivation of the premise. Let h  0, then G
is an atom. If G  true or G  H , then H  G is valid, hence CLU H  G by
(Nec) so that also CLU Sn > H  G by (IA). We can repeat the same reasoning
and conclude that CLU S1 >    Sn > H  G, so that also P [ D CLU S1 >    Sn
54 D. Gabbay et al. / J. Logic Programming 44 (2000) 37–74
> H  G. If G 2 Sn, then by (ID), (RCK), we get CLU Sn > H  G and then we
proceed as before. If G 2 Si, with i < n and there is Si > Si1 >    > Sn > G 2 D,
then by (IA) and propositional reasoning, we have
CLU Si >    > Sn > G  Siÿ1 > Si >    > Sn > H  G:
Hence, by (Nec) and (S5), we get
CLU Si >    > Sn > G  Siÿ1 > Si >    > Sn > H  G;
and hence by S5
CLU Si >    > Sn > G  Siÿ1 > Si >    > Sn > H  G:
Since P [ D CLU Si >    > Sn > G, we get
P [ D CLU Siÿ1 > Si >    > Sn > H  G:
By repeating the same argument up to S1, the claim follows.
Let h > 0, then if G is a conjunction or a conditional (S > G0), the claim easily
follows by the induction hypothesis, using (RCK) and axiom (AND) for the case
of conjunction. If G is an atom A, then there is some clause G0 ! A 2 P and the
derivation steps to
P;D j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘M G0;
so that by the induction hypothesis we have
 P [ D CLU S1 >    > Sn > H  G0:
By repeatedly using (RCK), (IA) and (S5) axioms and rules, we get
 CLU G0  A  S1 >    > Sn > H  G0  S1 >    Sn > H  A
We know that G0  A 2 P, so that P [ D CLU G0  A; hence by () and ()
the claim immediately follows. 
Theorem 4.2. (Completeness). If P[DCLU S1 >   Sn > H G, then P;D j S1 . . .Sn j
fHg ‘M G.
Proof. By contraposition we prove that if P;D j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘=M G, then
P [ D2CLU S1 >    Sn > H  G. Suppose P;D j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘=M G. We define
the structure M  W ; f ; V  where:
W  fR1; . . . ;Rk;B j kP 0;
Ri are conjunctions of atoms and B is an atom in Lg
If k  0, we write ;;B.
f a; R1; . . . ;Rk;B
 fR1; . . . ;Rk;R;C j C atom 2Lg if a is a conjunction of atoms R; otherwise:

V R1; . . . ;Rk;B  fC atom 2L such that P;D j R1; . . . ;Rk j fBg ‘M Cg:
We prove the following facts:
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• Claim 1. For every goal G and any world R1 . . .Rk;B, we have
P;D j R1 . . .Rk j fBg ‘M G iff M ; R1; . . . ;Rk;B  G:
• Claim 2. For every formula a and worlds w;w0, if w0 2 f a;w then M ;w0  a.
• Claim 3. For any world w 2 W , we have M ;w CLU P [ D.
Claim 1 is proved by an easy induction on the structure of G.
For Claim 2, let a  S, where S is a conjunction of atoms, and let
w0  R1; . . . ;Rk; S;C 2 f S; R1; . . . ;Rk;B; we have that for every D 2 S,
P;D j R1; . . . ;Rk; S j fCg ‘M D, hence by Claim 1, we get M ;w0  D, that is
M ;w0  S. If a is not a conjunction of atoms, the claim trivially follows.
We now prove Claim 3. Let w  S1; . . . ; Sn;B 2 W ; let G  A 2 P; it is
sucient to check that M ;w  G  A. Assume M ;w  G, then by Claim 1, we have
that
D;P j S1 . . . Sn j fBg ‘M G;
since G! A 2 P, by definition of ‘M , we have D;P j S1 . . . Sn j fBg ‘M A, and by
Claim 1 again, we finally obtain M ;w  A.
Now let R1 >    > Rk > A 2 D (with A 2 R1); we show that
M ;w  R1 >    > Rk > A. By the definition of the selection function, we must
prove that for any atom C 2L
M ; S1; . . . ; Sn;R1; . . . ;Rk;C  A:
By Claim 1, this corresponds to show that
D;P j S1 . . . SnR1 . . .Rk j fCg ‘M A;
but this holds by definition of ‘M , since R1 >    > Rk > A 2 D.
We are now able to complete the proof of the theorem. By hypothesis,
P;D j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘=M G; thus by Claim 1,
M ; S1; . . . ; Sn;H2G:
It is easy to see (by Claim 1 again) that
M ; S1; . . . ; Sn;H  H :
Hence we get
 M ; S1; . . . ; Sn;H2 H  G:
Let us consider the following chain of worlds
w0  ;;H0;w1  S1;H1;w2  S1; S2;H2; . . . ;wn  S1; . . . ; Sn;Hn;
where H0; . . . ;Hn 2L and Hn  H . Then, we have
 wn 2 f Sn;wnÿ1;wnÿ1 2 f Snÿ1;wnÿ2; . . . ;w1 2 f S1;w0:
By () and (), we obtain
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M ;w02S1 >    > Sn > H  G;
on the other hand, by Claim 3, we have M ;w0  P [ D, thus
P [ D2CLU S1 >    > Sn > H  G: 
4.2. The abductive procedure
The nonmonotonic abductive procedure can be obtained as an extension of the
monotonic procedure. The main dierence is that, whereas the monotonic procedure
makes use of a given set of persistency assumptions, the abductive procedure builds
the sets of abducibles DT and DF step by step during the derivation, starting with
DT  ; and DF  ;.
Therefore the proof rules of the abductive procedure will be the same as those of
the monotonic procedure, with an additional case to S-A (iii): if the abducible
Si >    > Sn > A does not belong to DT , we add the abducible to DT , provided
it is consistent. In this case it is necessary to start a new derivation to ensure the
consistency of the abducible, i.e., that the derivation
Si . . . Sn j fAg ‘? fails:
Furthermore, the abducible will be added to DT so that, if it is found again during the
derivation, the procedure will succeed immediately.
Notice that a success derivation and a failure derivation treat dierently the two
sets DT and DF . If an abducible assumption is needed during a success derivation, it is
seen as a positive assumption, i.e., an assumption that we want to be true. Thus, it is
added to DT , provided it is consistent. On the other hand, if an assumption is found
during a failure derivation, we want it to fail, and thus it is added to DF , provided it is
blocked.
Given the dierent behaviour of the two phases in the abductive procedure, we
formulate them by means of two dierent sets of proof rules. Since the sets of
assumptions change during the derivation we record their initial and final values
in the derivation relation, as follows:
DT ;DF P j Si . . . Sn j fHg ‘t G with D0T ;D0F 
meaning that, given the initial sets of assumptions DT ;DF , the goal G succeeds from
P j Si . . . Sn j fHg with abductive solution D0T ;D0F , where D0T  DT and D0F  DF .
Similarly, the symbol ‘f will denote the failure derivation relation.
In the description of the abductive procedure, we simplify the notation, omitting
the permanent database P from the proof rules, since it never changes during the
derivation.
Definition 4.2. Given a pair DT ;DF  of disjoint sets of abducibles, and a permanent
database P, we define success (failure) of a goal G with D0T ;D0F  by means of the
following proof rules:
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S-T DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘t true with DT ;DF 
S-^ DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘t G1 ^ G2 withD00T ;D00F  if
DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘t G1 with D0T ;D0F  and
D0T ;D0F S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘t G2 with D
00
T ;D
00
F 
S- > DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘t S > G with D0T ;D0F  if
DT ;DF S1 . . . SnS j ; ‘t G with D0T ;D0F 
S-A DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘t A with D0T ;D0F  if
i A 2 Sn or A  H and D0T  DT and D0F  DF ; or
ii there exists G! A 2 P such that DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘t
G with D0T ;D0F ; or
iii A 2 Sii  1 . . . nÿ 1 and Si >    > Sn > A 2 DT and
D0T  DT and D0F  DF ; or
iv A 2 Sii  1 . . . nÿ 1 and Si >    > Sn > A 62 DT and
Si >    > Sn > A 62 DF and
DT [ fSi >    > Sn > Ag;DF  Si . . . Sn j fAg ‘f? with D0T ;D0F 
F-^ DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘f G1 ^ G2 with D0T ;D0F  if
DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘f G1 with D0T ;D0F  or
DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘f G2 with D0T ;D0F 
F- > DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘f S > G with D0T ;D0F  if
DT ;DF S1 . . . SnS j ; ‘f G withD0T ;D0F 
F-A DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘f A with D0T ;D0F  if
i A 62 Sn and A 6 H and
ii let G1 ! A; . . . ;Gm ! A be all the clauses with head A in P; then
DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘f G1 with D1T ;D1F  and
D1T ;D1F S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘f G2 withD
2
T ;D
2
F  and
  
Dmÿ1T ;Dmÿ1F S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘f Gm withD
m
T ;D
m
F 
(if m  0, that is there are no clauses with head A, we let
DmT  DT ;DmF  DF ) and
if A 2 Sii  1; . . . ; nÿ 1; then either
iii Si >    > Sn > A 2 DmF and D0T  DmT and D0F  DmF ; or
iv Si >    > Sn > A 62 DmT and Si >    > Sn > A 62 DmF and
DmT ;DmF [ fSi >    > Sn > Ag Si    Sn j fAg ‘t? with D0T ;D0F 
else D0T  DmT and D0F  DmF :
We can observe that the two procedures for checking success and failure are
essentially dual. We can further notice that in checking the conjunctive success
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(or failure) of several goals we ‘‘accumulate’’ the assumptions used in the proof of
each goal. This happens for instance in the case (S-^) and in the case (F-A) (ii).
As an example let us see the main steps of a derivation in Example 2.6. To simplify
the notation, the sets of assumptions DT and DF are not given at each step, but only
when their value changes. Initially we have
DT  ; and DF  ;
 j ; ‘t fn battery; n bulbg > flight off g > n battery
fn battery; n bulbgflight off g j ; ‘t n battery:
According to rule S-A iv;DT becomes
DT  ffn battery; n bulbg > flight off g > n batteryg
and we have the following failure derivation:
fn battery; n bulbgflight off g j fn batteryg ‘f ?
fn battery; n bulbgflight off g j fn batteryg ‘f light on ^ light off 
fn battery; n bulbgflight off g j fn batteryg ‘f light on
fn battery; n bulbgflight off g j fn batteryg ‘f voltage ^ n bulb
fn battery; n bulbgflight off g j fn batteryg ‘f n bulb:
For this failure derivation to succeed, n bulb must fail, i.e., the assumption on the
persistency of n bulb must be blocked. This is obtained by adding the assumption to
DF and checking that it is blocked, i.e., that its negation :n bulb is derivable:
DT  ffn battery; n bulbg > flight off g > n batteryg and
DF  ffn battery; n bulbg > flight off g > n bulbg
fn battery; n bulbgflight off g j fn bulbg ‘t ?
from which we get, after some steps of derivation,
fn battery; n bulbgflight off g j fn bulbg ‘t n battery:
We can now apply rule S-A iii, since DT contains the assumption fn battery;
n bulbg > flight off g > n battery, and thus the derivation stops successfully.
Note that the last step of the derivation is almost the same as the second one.
However the derivation now stops because the relevant assumption has been previ-
ously added to DT .
In the following we show the soundness of the abductive procedure with respect to
the abductive semantic.
Lemma 4.1. Given a program P and a goal G,
1. if DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘t G with D0T ;D0F , then
• (a) for all S01 >    > S0m > A 2 D0T ÿ DT ;
P; Hÿ D0F  j S01 . . . S0m j fAg ‘=M ?
• (b) for all S01 >    > S0m > A 2 D0F ÿ DF ; P;D0T j S01 . . . S0m j fAg ‘M?
• (c) P;D0T j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘M G,
2. if DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘f G with D0T ;D0F , then
• (a) for all S01 >    > S0m > A 2 D0T ÿ DT ;
P; Hÿ D0F  j S01 . . . S0m j fAg ‘=M ?
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• (b) for all S01 >    > S0m > A 2 D0F ÿ DF ; P;D0T j S01 . . . S0m j fAg ‘M?.
• (c) P; Hÿ D0F  j S01 . . . S0n j fHg ‘=M G.
Proof. We prove both parts by a simultaneous induction on the height of derivation
of a query DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘x G with D0T ;D0F , with x  t; f .
• Correctness of the success derivation
(S-T ) Trivial.
(S-^) Let G  G1 ^ G2. (a) Let DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘t G1 with D0T ;D0F  and let
D0T ;D0F S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘t G2 with D00T ;D00F . Both of them succeed by derivations
of smaller height.
For (a), 8S01 >    > S0m > A 2 D0T ÿ DT ; we have P; Hÿ D0F  j S1
. . . S0m j fAg ‘=M ?, by inductive hypothesis, therefore P; Hÿ D00F  j S01 . . . S0m
j fAg ‘=M ?, since D0F  D00F .
Analogously, 8S01 >    > S0m > A 2 D00T ÿ D0T ;we have P; Hÿ D00F 
j S 01 . . . S0m j fAg‘=M ?, by inductive hypothesis.
It follows that 8S01 >    > S0m > A 2 D00T ÿ DT ; it holds P; Hÿ D00F 
j S 01 . . . S0m j fAg ‘=M ?
(b) The proof of this case is similar to the previous one.
(c) P;D0T j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘M G1 and P;D00T j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘M G2, by induc-
tive hypothesis.
Since D0T  D00T , P;D00T j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘M G1, and then P;D00T j S1 . . . Sn j
fHg ‘M G1 ^ G2.
(S->) Let G  S > G0. (a) and (b) follow from the induction hypothesis.
(c) By definition, DT ;DF  j S1 . . . SnS j ; ‘t G0 with D0T ;D0F  succeeds by a
derivation of smaller height, hence by the inductive hypothesis P;D0T
j S1 . . . SnS j ; ‘M G0, hence by definition of ‘M , P;D0T j S1 . . . Sn
j fHg ‘M S > G0.
(S-A) Let G be an atom B. All claims (a), (b) and (c) are trivial in the cases (i) and
(iii) in which the height of the derivation is 0, since DT ;DF   D0T ;D0F  and the
proof rules for ‘t and ‘M are the same.
Consider case (ii), that is, there exists a clause G0 ! B 2 P such that
DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘t G0 with D0T ;D0F  by a derivation of smaller height.
Claims (a) and (b) trivially follow by the induction hypothesis. Concerning
(c), by inductive hypothesis, we have P;D0T j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘M G0, hence also
P;D0T j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘M B, by definition of ‘M .
Consider case (iv), then B 2 Si, (for 16 i < n) and Si >    > Sn > B 62 DF
and
 DT [ fSi >    > Sn > Bg;DF  Si . . . Sn j fBg ‘f? withD0T ;D0F 
succeeds by a derivation of smaller height. By induction hypothesis, (a) holds
for assumptions in D0T ÿ DT [ fSi >    > Sn > Bg; we have still to check
(a) for Si >    > Sn > B 2 D0T ÿ DT . But by (), this follows from the induc-
tion hypothesis of case (2.c), namely
P; Hÿ D0F  j Si . . . Sn j fBg ‘=M ? :
(b) follows trivially by the induction hypothesis. Concerning (c), we have that
D0T contains Si >    > Sn > B, and since B 2 Si then P;D0T j S1 . . . Sn j
fHg ‘M B, by definition of ‘M .
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• Correctness of the failure derivation procedure
(F-^) Let G  G1 ^ G2. Since DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘f G1 ^ G2 with D0T ;D0F , either
DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘f G1 with D0T ;D0F  or DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg‘f G2 with
D0T ; D0F . In both cases the conclusions (a) and (b) hold by inductive hypothesis.
To prove (c), let DT ;DF S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘f G1 with D0T ;D0F  (the other case is
similar).
Then, P; Hÿ D0F  j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘=M G1 holds by inductive hypothesis, and
hence
P; Hÿ D0F  j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘=M G1 ^ G2 holds by definition of ‘M
(F->) Let G  S > G0. It holds that DT ;DF S1 . . . SnS j ; j‘f G0 with D0T ;D0F  by der-
ivation of smaller height. (a) By inductive hypothesis, 8S01 >
   > S 0m > A 2 D0T ÿ DT ;P; Hÿ D0F  j S01 . . . S0m j fAg ‘=M ?, which is our
thesis.
(b) The proof is similar to the previous one.
(c) By the inductive hypothesis, it holds that P; HÿD0F j S1 . . .SnS j ; ‘=M G0,
hence by definition of ‘M ;P; HÿD0F  j S1 . . .Sn j fHg ‘=M S > G0.
(F-A) Let G be an atom B. Then B 62 Sn and B 6 H . Let G1 ! B; . . . ;Gm ! B, be all
the clauses for B in P.
(a) For any hypothesis k 2 DmT ÿ DT , there is an index j; 16 j6m such that
k 2 DjT ÿ Djÿ1T  (we let DT  D0T ).
For all j  1; . . . ;m, by the inductive hypothesis, it holds that for all
kj  S01 >    > S0t > C 2 DjT ÿ Djÿ1T , we have
P; Hÿ DjF  S01 . . . S0t j fCg ‘=M kj:
Since DjT  DmT j  1; . . . ;m, it also holds that for all kj 
S 01 >    > S0t > C 2 DjT ÿ Djÿ1T ,
P; Hÿ DmF  j S01 . . . S0t j fCg ‘=M ? :
Therefore,
 for all S01 >    > S0t > C 2 DmT ÿ DT ; it holds P; Hÿ DmF S01 . . . S0t j
fCg ‘=M ? :
If either B 62 Si i  1; . . . ; nÿ 1, or B 2 Si and Si >    > Sn > B 2 DmF ,
(for i  1; . . . ; nÿ 1), then D0T  DmT , and D0F  DmF , therefore (a) is proved.
If B 2 Si; i < n, then DmT ;DmF [ fSi >    > Sn > Bg ‘t? with D0T ;D0F 
succeeds by a derivation of smaller height, so that by induction hypothesis of
case (1.a)
 8S 01 >    > S0t > C 2 D0T ÿ DmT ; it holds P; Hÿ D0F  j S01 . . . S0t
j fCg ‘=M ?;
Since DT  DmT  D0T , we have D0T ÿ DT  DmT ÿ DT  [ D0T ÿ DmT , hence by
() and () (a) holds.
(b) The proof is similar to the previous one.
(c) Consider any j  1 . . . ;m, and let DT  D0T , and DF  D0F . By inductive
hypothesis, since Djÿ1T ;Djÿ1F S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘f Gj with DjT ;DjF  by a smaller
derivation, it holds that P; Hÿ DjF  j S1 > . . . > Sn j fHg ‘=M Gj. From the
D. Gabbay et al. / J. Logic Programming 44 (2000) 37–74 61
monotonicity of ‘M , being DjF  DmF , it holds also that P; Hÿ DmF  j
S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘=M Gj, for all j. If B 62 Si, or B 2 Si and Si >    >
Sn > B 2 DmF , (for i  1; . . . ; nÿ 1), then D0F  DmF , therefore
 P; Hÿ D0F  j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘=M Gj; for all j:
Moreover, in case B 2 Si and Si >    > Sn > B 2 DmF , since D0F  DmF , we
have
 Si >    > Sn > B 62 Hÿ D0F :
Since B 62 Sn and B 6 H , by () and () and by definition of ‘M we have
Hÿ D0F  j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘=M B:
There is a last case, let B 2 Si and DmT ;DmF [ fSi >    > Sn > Bg
j S1 . . . Sn j fBg ‘t? with D0T ;D0F  succeed by a derivation of smaller height;
thus by the induction hypothesis P; Hÿ DmF  j S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘=M Gj for all
j  1; . . . ;m. Hence, by the fact that DmF  D0F , and the monotonicity of the
‘M , we can conclude again the above (). Since DmF [ fSi >    > Sn > Bg
 D0F , we have Si >    > Sn > B 2 D0F , so that again we get (). From
() and () the thesis follows exactly as before. 
Theorem 4.3. Given a permanent database P and a goal G,
• if ;; ;S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘t G with DT ;DF  then DT ;DF  is an abductive solution for
S1 >    > Sn > H  G, i.e., P [ DT CLU S1 >    > Sn > H  G,
• if ;; ;S1 . . . Sn j fHg ‘f G with DT ;DF  then DT ;DF  is an abductive solution for
S1 >    > Sn > H  G and P [ DT 2CLU S1 >    > Sn > H  G.
Proof. It immediately follows by the previous lemma and by the soundness and com-
pleteness of the monotonic proof procedure with respect to =CLU (Theorems 4.1, and
4.2.) 
The procedure is not complete: it can be the case that an abductive solution for
a given goal G and program P exists, but it cannot be computed. The incomplete-
ness may be caused by dierent reasons. In the absence of hypothetical goals in P
and G, the derivation procedure behaves like the ‘‘classical’’ goal directed deriva-
tion procedures for logic programming with negation as failure [28]. Thus, it inher-
its their incompleteness in the cases of loops, that is, in the presence of clauses of
the form a a. These cases can be handled by adapting the existing loop checking
techniques.
The incompleteness may also be due to the infinity of the abductive solution: it
may be the case that a solution DT ;DF  exists, but at least one of the sets of assump-
tions DT and DF is infinite. Of course, the procedure cannot finitely compute an
infinite solution.
To make this point clearer, consider the following example.
Example 4.1. The permanent part P of the program contains the following rules:
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f > k ! a
b! k
a! k
f ^ b!?
r ^ a!? :
Let us consider the derivation of the hypothetical goal r > b > r from P.
(With a slight abuse of notation, we identify a singleton in the removable part of
the program with the element it contains.)
P j  ‘t r > b > r
P j r j  ‘t b > r
P j rb j  ‘t r:
The atom r appears in the removable part of the program, therefore the abducible
r > b > r is added to DT , and a failure derivation is activated with the initial
query
P j rb j frg ‘f?
which steps to the two queries (corresponding to the two rules having ? as their
heads)
P j rb j frg ‘f f ^ b and P j rb j frg ‘f r ^ a:
The former trivially fails, since neither f nor b appear as clause heads in P. Finding a
failure derivation for the latter is more dicult. Any derivation will go on as follows
P j rb j frg ‘f r ^ a
P j rb j frg ‘f a since r is the hypothesis
P j rb j frg ‘f f > k
P j rbf j  ‘f k:
This derivation has two branches, corresponding to the rules in P having k as their
heads.
The first branch is
P j rbf j  ‘f b:
Since b appears in the removable part of the program, we add the abducible
b > f > b to DF , and we search a success derivation of ?, in the context bf j fbg.
The derivation can be easily found, since b is the hypothesis, and f belongs to the
final set in the derivation context.
The second branch is the following:
P j rbf j  ‘f k
P j rbf j  ‘f a:
We have entered a loop, which generates an infinite sequence of failure derivations,
as follows.
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P j rbf j  ‘f f > k
P j rbff j  ‘f k:
Again, we have two branches, the first one resulting in the addition of the abducible
b > f > f > b to DF , and the other one starting the derivation
P j rbff j  ‘f a:
Thus, an infinite set DF  fb > f > b;b > f > f > b; . . . ; b > f > . . . f >
bg is produced.
This infinite set DF , and the set DT  fr > b > rg, are the second and the first
components, respectively, of an abductive solution for the given goal. This solution
cannot be found by the procedure.
5. Relations with belief revision
We have seen that the addition of new information in the database can produce
inconsistencies, that are resolved by the revision mechanism incorporated in the
proof procedure. In this section we investigate how this revision process is related
to belief revision theory, and, in particular, we compare our approach with priori-
tized base revision introduced by Nebel in Ref. [31].
Prioritized base revision is a form of syntax based revision in which the belief base
Z, subject to revision, is partitioned into disjoint priority classes Zi, iP 1. In our case,
the priority classes are given by the sets of facts S1; . . . ; Sn which are created by the
evaluation of a conditional query S1 >    > Sn > A from P.
We recall the definition of prioritized base revision of finite belief bases as given in
Ref. [31]. Let PC be classical logic consequence and let CnT , for a set of formulas
T, be the set of logical consequences of T in classical logic. Let Z be a belief base
partitioned into disjoint priority classes Zi, iP 1 and let / be a formula. The prior-
itized removal of / (written Z + /) is the set of all maximal subsets of Z not implying
/, where the sentences in Zi have higher priority than those in Zj, for i < j:
Z + /  Y  Z j Y 2 PC/; Y
(

[
iP 1
Yi;
8iP 1 :
"
Yi  Zi and
8X : Yi  X  Zi )
[iÿ1
j1
Yj [ X
!
‘PC /
 #)
:
When the belief base Z is finite, the prioritized base revision operation, denoted by ,
can be defined as follows:
Z  /  Cn 
WZ + :/ ^ /  if 2 PC :/
Z ^ / otherwise:
(
Notice that, in the definition above, we have used the negation :, rather than the
boolean negation , and, as usual, :/ has to be interpreted as / ?. Hence, in the
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following, when we say that a set of formulas R is consistent (in PC), we mean that
R =PC ?. We want to compare the evaluation of a goal S1 > . . . > Sn > A from P
with the revision of a prioritized base. Suppose that, in proving the above goal,
S1; . . . ; Snÿ1 have been added to the program and Sn > A is the goal remaining to
be proved. The addition of Sn to the program P j S1 . . . Snÿ1 can be regarded as a re-
vision of the belief base Z  S1 [    [ Snÿ1 with 
V
Sn ^P, where the priority class-
es are Z1  Snÿ1; Z2  Snÿ2, . . ., Znÿ1  S1, and 
V
Sn is the conjunction of the atoms
in Sn.
Since the information in P is permanent, it has to hold after any revision. For this
reason, P is inserted together with the new set of facts Sn. In order to make a com-
parison with Nebel’s revision, we have to restrict our consideration to sets P of
clauses and constraints not containing conditional formulas (the revision formula
cannot contain conditionals).
We want to establish a correspondence between abductive solutions for P and the
prioritized base revision. To this purpose, we say that an abductive solution DT ;DF 
for P is total with respect to S1; . . . ; Sn, if for all assumptions in H of the form
Si >    > Sn > A with i  1; . . . ; nÿ 1, either Si >    > Sn > A 2 DT or
Si >    > Sn > A 2 DF (see the end of Section 3, for comments about the totality
requirement).
No requirement of totality is put on the other assumptions in H.
LetP be a set of clauses and constraints that do not contain conditional formulas,
P  fG  A : G  A 2 Pg and S1; . . . ; Sn be sets of atomic formulas.
Theorem 5.1. Assume that P [ Sn2CLU ?. There is a bijective mapping between the
abductive solutions DT ;DF  for P that are total with respect to S1; . . . ; Sn and the sets
Y 2 Z + :V Sn ^P, where Z  S1 [    [ Snÿ1 is a belief base with priority classes
Zj Snÿj, j  1; . . . ; nÿ 1.
Note that the class Si1, has higher priority than Si. Updating with a set of atoms
Sn a program P with protected part P, corresponds to updating the revisable part of
P with Sn and P.
To prove Theorem 5.1 we need the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. For each permanent database P not containing conditional formulas and
for each set of abducibles D,
• P [ D CLU S1 > . . . > Sn > A iff P [ DS1;...;Sn PC A
• P [ D CLU S1 > . . . > Sn > :A iff P [ DS1;...;Sn PC :A
where DS1;...;Sn  fA : Si >    > Sn > A 2 D; A 2 Si and i  1; . . . ; nÿ 1g
S
Sn.
Lemma 5.1 is an easy consequence of the completeness of the monotonic proof
procedure. When P does not contain conditional formulas, the context S1 . . . Sn of
the derivation is determined by the initial goal and it does not change during the
proof. Hence the proof can be regarded as a standard SLD-proof in which, at
each step, either a clause in P or a hypothesis in D is used. DS1;...;Sn is a set of
atoms containing all the atoms from S1 . . . Sn which are visible in that context.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let Z  S1 [    [ Snÿ1 be a belief base with priority classes
Zj  Snÿj; j  1; . . . ; nÿ 1. Assume that P [ Sn =CLU ?. We will prove the following:
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(i) Given an abductive solution DT ;DF  for P that is total with respect to
S1; . . . ; Sn: if
Y  fA : Si >    > Sn > A 2 DT ;A 2 Si and i  1; . . . ; nÿ 1g;
then
Y 2 Z + :
^
Sn
 
^P
 
:
(ii) If
Y 2 Z + :
^
Sn
 
^P
 
;
then there is a total abductive solution DT ;DF  for P such that
Y  fA : Si >    > Sn > A 2 DT ;A 2 Si and i  1; nÿ 1g:
We first prove (i). Let us define, for all i  1; . . . ; nÿ 1,
Yi  fA : Si >    > Sn > A 2 DT and A 2 Sig
so that Y  Snÿ1i1 Yi. To prove that Y 2 Z + :V Sn ^P, we have to prove that Y
is a subset of Z such that Y 2PC :
V
Sn ^P and that Y is maximal according to
the priority classes.
Let us first prove Y 2PC :
V
Sn ^P. If Y  ;, then this is obvious. In fact, from
the fact that Sn [P =CLU ? it follows that of Sn [P =PC ?. If Y 6 ;, let k be the
least i  1; . . . ; nÿ 1 such that Yi 6 ;. Then there is an assumption
Sk >    > Sn > B 2 DT . By property (b) of abductive solutions (and by totality
w.r.t. S1; . . . ; Sn) P [ DT =CLU Sk >    > Sn > :B. By Lemma 5.1, P [ DT ;Sk ;...;Sn
=PC :B, that is, P [ Yk [    [ Ynÿ1 [ Sn =PC :B. Hence, by definition of Y and since
B 2 Yk, P [ Y [ Sn =PC ?, that is Y =PC :
V
Sn ^P.
To show that Y is maximal according to the priority classes, let us assume, by
absurdum, that, for some i  1; . . . ; nÿ 1 and for some B 2 Si such that
B 62 Yi X  Yi [ fBg is consistent (in PC) with 
Snÿ1
ji1 Yj [ Sn [P, that isSnÿ1
ji1 Yj [ X =PC :
V
Sn ^P. This means that P [ Yi [    [ Ynÿ1 [ Sn =PC :B.
Hence, P [ DT ;Si ;...;Sn =PC :B, and, by Lemma 5.1, P [ DT 2CLU Si >    > Sn > :B.
Since, DT is an abductive solution that is total w.r.t. S1; . . . ; Sn: Si >    >
Sn > B 2 DT , which contradicts the initial hypothesis.
Let us now prove (ii). Given Y 2 Z + :V Sn ^P, by construction Y  Snÿ1i1 Yi,
where Yi  Si, for all i  1; . . . ; nÿ 1 (note that, for i < j, Sj has higher priority then
Si).
We define an abductive solution DT ;DF  for P which is total w.r.t. S1; . . . ; Sn as
follows:
DT  fSi >    > Sn > A : A 2 Yi and i  1; . . . ; nÿ 1g
DF  fSi >    > Sn > A : A 62 Yi and i  1; . . . ; nÿ 1g:
Note that the assumptions on sequences dierent from S1; . . . ; Sn are included neither
in DT nor in DF . We have to show that DT ;DF  is an abductive solution.
We first verify condition (a) of Definition 3.2 For all i  1; . . . ; nÿ 1, if
Si >    > Sn > A 2 DF then A 62 Yi. Let X  Yi [ fAg. Since Yi is a maximal con-
sistent subset of Si according to the prioritization, then:
Snÿ1
ji1 Yj [ X PC
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:V Sn ^P. Hence P [ Yi [    [ Ynÿ1 [ Sn PC :A, that is, P [ DT ;Si ;...;Sn PC
:A. Hence, by Lemma 5.1, P [ DT CLU Si >    > Sn > :A.
To verify condition (b) of Definition 3.2, let us assume that for some i  1; . . . ;
nÿ 1, Si >    > Sn > A 2 DT . Then, by construction A 2 Yi. Since
Snÿ1
ji Yj =PC
:V Sn ^P, that is, Yi is consistent (in PC) with Snÿ1ji1 Yj [ Sn [P, and since
A 2 Yi, we have P [ Yi [    [ Ynÿ1 [ Sn =PC :A, that is, P [ DT ;Si ;...;Sn[ =PC :A.
Hence, by Lemma 5.1, P [ DT =CLU Si >    > Sn > :A. 
The following corollary follows easily from the theorem above.
Corollary 5.1. Assume that P [ Sn2CLU ?. The following statements are equivalent:
• for all abductive solutions DT ;DF  for P that are total with respect to S1; . . . ; Sn
P [ DT CLU S1 >    > Sn > A;
• A 2 Z  V Sn ^P;
where Z  S1 [    [ Snÿ1 is a belief base with priority classes Zj Snÿj,
j  1; . . . ; nÿ 1.
Observe that Theorem 5.1 does not hold if P [ Sn is not consistent, i.e., if
P [ Sn CLU?. In this case, P [ Sn PC?, hence,
Z 
^
Sn
 
^P
 
 Z [P [ Sn:
From Z [P [ Sn we cannot conclude all formulas, since ? is not classical falsity, but
we can conclude (for instance) all A 2 Z. On the other hand, for all abductive solu-
tions DT ;DF  for P it holds
P [ DT CLU S1 >    > Sn >? :
However, since ? blocks the persistency of all the assumptions in the revisable part,
we do not necessarily conclude P [ DT CLU S1 >    > Sn > A for all A 2 Z.
6. The predicate case
So far we have focused on the propositional case to keep the exposition simple.
The procedure can be extended to a first-order setting in a rather simple way by mak-
ing use of the standard unification mechanism. We do not give a full account here
and we limit our considerations to a few key points. We begin by observing that
in a first-order query such as P j S1 . . . Sk j fHg ‘t G, free variables may occur either
in the goal G, or in facts in Si, or in the hypothesis H. In every case, the free variables
are interpreted existentially, i.e., in the same way as goal variables. Thus, for instance
the trivial query
; j  j ; ‘t fpX ; qX g > pa ^ qb fails:
To see this, the computation steps to
; j fpX ; qX g j ; ‘t pa ^ qb;
If we unify X with a, we get
; j fpa; qag j ; ‘t qb;
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which fails; alternatively, if we unify X with b we obtain
; j fpb; qbg j ; ‘t pa;
which fails as well. This shows that substitutions must be applied also to the facts in
the revisable list (and to the hypothesis). Moreover, dierent goals may happen to be
evaluated in dierent contexts determined by dierent hypothetical goals; consider
the following goal:
pX  > qY  > rX ; Y  ^ pX  > tU ; L > sU ;X ; L:
As an eect of the rules, the goal rX ; Y  is evaluated in a context where we have add-
ed fpX g; fqY g, whereas sU ;X ; L in a context where we have added
fpX g; ftU ; Lg. Thus, the structure of queries must be generalized to sequences
of pairs context; goal, where each context is determined by a revisable list and a hy-
pothesis. We will not go further into these types of details which are common to all
first-order hypothetical extensions of logic programming; we refer the reader to Refs.
[18,19].
We rather concentrate on the specific features of the first order extension of our
language. Let us see a more significant example of first-order computation, consid-
ering the following database P:
P 
8X fairX  ^ darkX  !?:
8Y greekY  ^ natural hairedY  ! darkY :
8UalbinoU ! fairU:
albinotom
8><
>>:
together with the two revisable facts natural hairedtom; natural hairedfred. Giv-
en the data P j fnatural hairedtom; natural hairedfredg, we want to determine
who would be dark if (s)he were greek. This corresponds to the query:
P j fnatural hairedtom; natural hairedfredg j ; ‘t greekX  > darkX :
The computation proceeds as shown below. We simplify the mechanism by ignoring
the computation of the abductive assumptions, since they are not used.
P j fnat hairtom; nat hairfredg j ; ‘t greekX  > darkX 
P j fnat hairtom; nat hairfredgfgreekX g j ; ‘t darkX 
‘t greekX  ^ nat hairX 
The goal greekX  unifies with the fact greekX  without instantiating X. Thus we are
left with
P j fnat hairtom; nat hairfredgfgreekX g j ; ‘t nat hairX :
The goal nat hairX  unifies with both facts in the revisable list. Let us try X  tom
first. We must show that nat hairtom persists, which amounts to show that
P j fnat hairtom; nat hairfredgfgreektomg j fnat hairtomg ‘f?
Now the derivation proceeds as follows ()
P j fnat hairtom; nat hairfredgfgreektomg j fnat hairtomg ‘f?
‘f fairU ^ darkU
‘f albinoU ^ darkU
‘f greektom ^ nat hairtom
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Since it does hold neither ‘f greektom, nor ‘f nat hairtom, the derivation fails,
that is to say nat hairtom does not persist.
Let us try X  fred. We must show that nat hairfred persists:
P j fnat hairtom; nat hairfredgfgreekfredg j fnat hairfredg ‘f ?
‘f fairU ^ darkU
‘f albinoU ^ darkU
‘f greektom ^ nat hairtom
‘f greektom
success as greektom
does not match anything:
The fact nat hairfred persists, so that the answer to the original query is X  fred.
With the full abductive computation, for X  tom, we would have added the
abducible
nat hairtom ^ nat hairfred > greektom > nat hairtom
to an initially empty DT and then the computation would have gone on as in (). The
second case, for X  fred, is analogous.
The diculties we encounter in the first-order extension are similar to those of
first-order logic programs with negation as failure. The critical point is that a
straightforward extension of the procedure, as the one we have sketched, may only
compute success answers, i.e., substitutions for which a goal succeeds. The problem
arises when a derivation steps to queries of the following kind:
P j S1 . . . Sk j fHX g ‘f? :
This amounts to search an instance of X which makes ? fail. Unless we provide a
mechanism to search for failure answers, the computation cannot continue at this
point. The situation is exactly analogous to the so-called floundering computations
which occur in conventional logic programs with negation by failure. The above
situation may occur when we argue about the persistency of an uninstantiated
hypothesis as in the following example:
P j  j ; ‘t pX  > qb > pX ;
where P contains ra and pb ^ qb !?. The derivation steps to
P j fpX gfqbg j ; ‘t pX :
This goal succeeds if we can find an X such that the assumption pX  persists. We
should hence find an X such that
P j fpX gfqbg j fpX g ‘f? :
And here we are blocked (although one would expect an answer of the form X 6 b,
whence X  a). Moreover, it is clear that the computation of abductive assumptions
does no longer make sense if there are free variables in the assumptions: how can we
decide to put pX  > qb > pX  in DT rather than in DF , if the consistency of
the assumption depends on what X will be?
The simplest way to deal with this situation is to study syntactical restrictions
which prevent computations leading to queries of the form
P j S1 . . . Sk j fHX g ‘f? :
where we check the persistency of an uninstantiated fact HX . More generally, we
must prevent ‘f -derivations in which there are free variables either in the Si or in the
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hypothesis H. The whole subject is very similar to the one of avoiding floundering in
a language which combines hypothetical implication and negation by failure. In Ref.
[24] a number of syntactic restrictions, called allowedness restrictions, are defined to
this purpose. These restrictions generalize the usual allowedness restrictions for con-
ventional logic programs with negation by failure (see Ref. [28]). We expect that sim-
ilar restrictions work for this language, where the problem is actually simpler4.
7. Conclusions and related work
In this paper we have defined a language for hypothetical and counterfactual rea-
soning. The language is based on a conditional logic and it supports hypothetical in-
sertions in a knowledge base that may contain integrity constraints. The language
relies on a revision mechanism which, on the basis of priority information, restores
the knowledge base consistency when a violation occurs. We have provided a logical
characterization of the language based on abduction, and an abductive proof proce-
dure. Moreover we have shown how this language is related to belief revision theory,
by comparing it with Nebel’s prioritized base revision.
This paper extends the work in Ref. [21] where a more restricted language was
studied, in which only hypothetical insertions of single atomic formulas were al-
lowed, and whose semantics was based on a completion construction. Here we have
considered more complex updates by sets of hypotheses. We had therefore to cope
with the possibility of having alternative (equally plausible) revisions of the know-
ledge base. These alternative revisions can be captured by an abductive approach.
The abductive approach we have presented is modular with respect to the adopted
monotonic logic. A similar approach has been followed in Ref. [2] to define a lan-
guage based on a modal logic for reasoning about actions.
In Ref. [31] it is shown that prioritized base revision is expressively equivalent to
skeptical provability in Brewka’s LDT’s (level default theories) [7], which provide a
generalization of Poole’s system with priorities. Therefore, when programs do not
contain conditional formulas, we can establish a correspondence between our lan-
guage and Brewka’s LDT.
On the other hand, a similar correspondence does not hold with the prioritized
extensions of default logic introduced by Brewka in Refs. [8,9]. In such default logics
a partial ordering between default rules is allowed. Moreover, in Ref. [9], reasoning
about priorities can be modelled, since priority information can be explicitly repre-
sented in the logical language by naming default rules.
In this paper we have used a conditional logic as the logical basis of our language.
There are other approaches which instead rely on the use of modal logics. For in-
stance, the language presented in Ref. [17] contains a modal operator assume[L]
(where L is a literal) to represent addition and deletion of atomic formulas. Our pro-
posal is also related to Ref. [11], where the problem of reasoning with multiple sourc-
es of information is studied for the case when the knowledge sources are (consistent)
4 In the language studied in [24] programs and goals can be mutually nested; this is not permitted in this
language.
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sets of positive and negative literals, and there is no underlying (protected) theory.
Also in Ref. [11] a modal language is adopted.
The problem of combining theories and resolving inconsistencies among them has
also been studied in Ref. [3]. In particular, Ref. [3] analyzes the problem of combin-
ing prioritized (first order) theories, T1  T2      Tk  IC where the priority rela-
tion is a total order, and a set of integrity constraints IC has the highest priority.
Two approaches are devised: bottom-up and top-down. With the bottom-up approach
T1 is combined with T2, with preference to T2;
5 the result is combined with T3, and so
on, until the result is combined with Tk, and, finally, with IC. Referring to Example
1.1 in the introduction, let us consider the eect of adopting a bottom up approach in
our language.6 With a bottom-up approach the query {orange_coat, no_hat,
pink_mercedes} > ({ black_coat, no_hat}> (light_coat > suspect_Jeff)) fails from
the program. In fact, orange_coat is overridden by the more reliable information
black_coat, which, in turn, is overridden by the more reliable information light_coat.
Since orange_coat is deleted, suspect_Jeff cannot be concluded. The operational se-
mantics of the language presented in Ref. [19] is essentially based on this bottom-up
approach. However, the case addressed in Ref. [19] is much simpler then the one in
Ref. [3], since each theory contains a single formula.
The top-down approach amounts to start combining Tk with IC (with preference
to IC), then combining Tkÿ1 with the result (with preference for the last one), and so
on, up to T1. The top-down approach is the one we have adopted in this paper. Com-
ing back to the example above, since the most preferred fact light_coat overrides
black_coat, the fact orange_coat is not deleted and, hence, suspect_Jeff can be con-
cluded. As observed in Ref. [3], top-down combining is more informative then bot-
tom-up combining (in the example, orange_coat is deleted in the bottom-up
approach but not in the top-down one).
In our language the nonmonotonic behaviour is achieved through the dierent
priorities of sets of updates. A somewhat similar approach is followed in the lan-
guage Ordered Logic (OL) [29,30]. A program in this language is a monotonic ex-
tended logic program, where negated literals can occur also in the head of rules.
The nonmonotonic behaviour is obtained by partitioning the program into a set
of components, each consisting of a set of rules, organized into an inheritance hier-
archy. If two rules in two dierent components have contradictory conclusions A
and :A, then the rule which is more specific in the hierarchy overrules the other one.
Of course, since the hierarchy of components is a partial ordering, it may happen
that two conflicting rules belong to two components which are not related in the hi-
erarchy. In this case there will be two equally acceptable solutions. In Ref. [10] a sta-
ble model semantics is defined for OL, and an eective method, using backtracking
and nondeterminism, is proposed for computing OL stable models.
5 Ref. [3] discusses several functions to combine theories, based on the computation of maximal
consistent subsets. In particular, T1 is combined with T2, with preference to T2 by taking all the theories
obtained by adding to T2 a maximal subset of T1 consistent with T2.
6 Remember that, while in Ref. [3] the ordered theories contain general formulas (and, in particular,
rules), in our language ordered theories contain only sets of atoms, while there is a common protected
theory P.
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The problem of composing logical theories is also addressed in Ref. [1], which
deals with updates of knowledge bases represented as sequences of logic programs.
Programs may contain default negation not only in the body of clauses but also in
their heads. The paper presents a program transformation which takes a sequence
of programs and produces a unique program with new propositional variables,
which allow the priority of rules to be explicitly represented. The resulting program
does no longer contain default negation in the head of clauses. Moreover, default ne-
gation is contained only in the body of special ‘‘persistency’’ rules, which model per-
sistency of atoms through the priority levels.
Both languages use a ‘‘top-down’’ approach, similar to the one we adopt in this
paper. The main dierence between our language and the previous ones is that they
do not allow hypothetical reasoning, and thus dependencies among components
are determined statically. On the other hand, our language does not allow to spec-
ify a partial ordering among sets of updates, but only a total ordering dynamically
built.
Another dierence is that in our language we can update programs only by adding
atoms and not clauses. However we have shown that this is not a significant dier-
ence, since we can achieve the same eect by giving names to the rules. Furthermore,
in our language we have integrity constraints, and thus an atom can be assumed to
persist if ? is not derived. On the other hand, in the other approaches, an atom can
be assumed only if its negation does not hold.
The language we have defined is also related to other logic programming languag-
es dealing with explicit negation and constraints, and faced with the problem of re-
moving contradictions when they occur. In particular, Pereira et al. in Ref. [34]
present a contradiction removal semantics and, in Ref. [35], a proof-procedure (sim-
ilar to an abductive procedure) for extended logic programs with explicit negation
and integrity constraints.
In Ref. [13] a capability of hypothetical query answering against embedded impli-
cations with integrity constraints is introduced into the framework of deductive da-
tabases. Embedded implications are transformed into (query equivalent) deductive
databases with null values, and a methodology for hypothetical query answering
from the resulting databases is described. Integrity constraints are used as a way
of eliminating irrelevant hypotheses (only relevant hypotheses which render the sit-
uation queried about possible are produced).
Kakas et al. in Ref. [27] propose a logic programming language without negation
as failure based on the idea of defining a priority relation on the rules of a program,
whose semantics is given in terms of the acceptability semantics discussed in
Section 4.
In defining our language we have chosen a specific policy to deal with updates. In
particular, more recent updates are given a higher priority than the previous ones. In
principle, however, other policies might be used. For instance, updates with the low-
est priority could be allowed, and this could be useful to deal with default assump-
tions which are expected to have a lower priority than other kinds of assumptions in
updates. Of course, these extensions of the language would require a modification of
the logic on which the language is based, and, in particular, a modification of the
conditions (a) and (b) in the definition of the abductive semantics, that are ad hoc
for the chosen policy. By contrast, allowing clauses in the revisable part of the pro-
gram, would only require a minor extension of the language.
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